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Observers around the world are impressed by the rapid growth of China’s economy. While outside 
observers tend to focus on the success story of unprecedented growth policy documents and recent 
domestic debates in China have pointed to the need for a shift in the growth trajectory with stronger 
emphasis on ‘endogenous innovation’ and ‘harmonious development’. This paper attempts to 
capture the current characteristics of China’s production and innovation system; how they were 
shaped by history and what major challenges they raise for the future. On the basis of the analysis 
the authors propose that it is possible to link together the two key concepts ‘endogenous innovation’ 
and ‘harmonious development’ by focusing innovation and development efforts in China on 
domestic needs, including social needs, rather than a one-sided focus on export-promotion and 
commodity production. 
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1. Introduction 
Observers around the world are impressed by the rapid growth of China’s economy, 
some with hope and others with fear. Some hope that China will offer the unique 
experience of successful economic growth and catch-up under the new WTO regime; 
some see the rise of China as a threat to the current world order and to the powers that 
currently dominate the world in terms of economy, technology and politics.   
While outside observers tend to focus on the success story of unprecedented growth 
policy documents and recent domestic debates in China have pointed to the need for a 
shift in the growth trajectory with stronger emphasis on ‘endogenous innovation’ and 
‘harmonious development’. In this paper we make an attempt to capture the current 
characteristics of China’s production and innovation system; how they were shaped by 
history and what major challenges they raise for the future. 
In section 2 we present data on China’s post-war growth experience. We show how 
the shift in policy toward decentralization, privatization and openness around 1980 
established an institutional setting that, together with other factors such as the 
presence of a wide ‘Chinese Diaspora’, has resulted in extremely high rates of capital 
accumulation especially in manufacturing. The section ends with pointing to some 
inherent contradictions in the current growth pattern. 
In section 3 we take a closer look at how the policy shift in the eighties affected the 
institutional framework shaping R&D activities in particular, and learning and 
innovation in general. The attempt to break down the barrier between the science and 
technology infrastructure on the one hand and the production sphere on the other was 
highly successful as compared to the development in the former Soviet Union. But the 
original intentions were not fully realized. Rather than establishing markets for 
science and technology, the reforms led knowledge producers to engage in mergers or 
forward vertical integration and they became to a large extent involved in production 
activities.    2
   
Referring back to the analysis of the sustainability of the growth model and the 
unfinished reform of the innovation system Section 4 introduces the recent decision 
by China’s government to promote endogenous innovation and harmonious 
development. Applying the innovation system perspective we argue that these broadly 
defined objectives can be realized only through a strategic adjustment towards 
‘innovation driven growth and learning based development’ and we discuss what 
important policy elements such a strategic adjustment needs to encompass.   
In  section 5 we conclude that imperfections in the division of labor and in the 
interaction between users and producers of knowledge and innovation that was behind 
the reforms of the eighties remain central concerns. In order to raise the long-term 
efficiency of the massive accumulation of production capital it is necessary to 
promote the formation of social capital and to be more considerate when exploiting 
natural capital. 
2. The transition of China’s economy   
How to explain the extra-ordinary growth performance of China? What are the unique 
features of the production system? In this section we will see how the development 
paths of the past define the strengths and weaknesses of the national production 
systems as well as the bottlenecks and challenges that confront China today. 
It is useful to distinguish between two periods in China in the second half of the 20
th 
century. The crucial shift takes place in 1978 when DENG Xiaoping took over the 
political leadership after Chairman MAO and initiated economic reform and the 
opening of the economy to international trade. The first was a period of development 
under a centrally planned economic regime and the second a period with 
market-oriented reforms and economic transition. To characterize economic 
performance of the two periods, we use the data summarized by A. Maddison 
(Maddison 1998) depicted in Table 1 and Figures 1 and 2.   
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Table 1: Growth of China’s economy 1890-1995 (At constant prices) 
 
1890-1952 1952-1978 1978-1995 1952-1995 
Farming, Fishery & Forestry  0.3  2.2  5.1  3.4 
Industry 1.7  9.6  8.5  9.2 
Construction 1.6  7.2  11.1  8.7 
Transport & Communications  0.9  6.0  10.0  7.6 
Commerce & Restaurants  0.8  3.3  9.9  5.9 
Other Services (incl. Government)  1.1  4.2  6.7  5.2 
GDP 0.6  4.4  7.5  5.6 
Per Capita GDP  0.0  2.3  6.0  3.8 
Export Volume  1.6  6.4  13.5  9.2 













Source: Maddison 1998: 56, Tables 3.1 and 3.2 
At the time of the revolution the economy was still dominated by agriculture; in 1952 
about 60 percent of GDP was generated by the agricultural (primary) sector, as shown 
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in Figure 2. Both the first and the second period were dominated by industrialization, 
rather than “post-industrialization” that took place after WWII in developed and most 
less developed countries. As a result, China ends up being highly “industrialized” by 
the end of the century. In 2003, the GDP structure of China is 12.5, 46 and 41.5 in 
terms of percentage for the primary, secondary and tertiary industry respectively. The 
growth in manufacturing and the relative shrinkage of agriculture went on also in the 
1990s, and the value added-share of the service sectors remained almost unchanged 
until the second half of the 1990s. 
But as we shall see below the economic structure looks quite different when the focus 
is upon employment rather than value added. The proportion of the labor force 
working in agriculture remains as high as 50% in the beginning of the new 
millennium. The growth in manufacturing value added reflects more than anything 
else a very high rate of accumulation of fixed capital accompanied by high rates of 
growth in labor productivity. 
Behind the high growth rates and the restructuring of the economy in the second 
period lie extraordinary rates of savings and capital accumulation. In order to 
understand how these could be realized in a poor country like China it is necessary to 
look at the institutional changes that took place with the shift in the political climate.   
Reforms and development performance in the 1980s and 1990s 
The policies transforming the economy from a centrally planned towards a 
market-oriented regime may be seen as following two parallel and mutually 
reinforcing lines of action aiming at respectively decentralization and privatization 
(Wu 2003, Chapter 2).   
The first line of action, “bureaucratic decentralization”, began with increasing the 
autonomy of firms in decision-making on production planning, investment and 
acquisition of technology, marketing, pricing and personnel and with more autonomy 
to local governments in financial, budgetary and administrative issues. Initially 
decentralization was based on ad hoc negotiations in individual cases. It was not until   5
   
the mid-1990s, that nation-wide reforms formalized the relationships and introduced 
more transparent and coherent rules. This was the period when reforms of taxation, 
banking system and governance structure of state-owned enterprises—i.e. 
“corporatization” of previously state-ownership - were initiated. Actually this 
dynamic of policy learning where experiences from local and regional 
experimentation were gradually diffused at the national level has been one major 
characteristic of the reform period.     
The second line of action loosened the restrictions first for township and village 
enterprises in the early 1980s and later also for private initiatives in the mid-1990s. It 
included the creation of “Special Economic Zones” for FDI related investment with 
various favorable regulations. In provinces like Zhejiang this led to private initiatives 
by entrepreneurs. Here limited arable land, poor mineral deposits, high population 
density and little accumulation in modern industry in combination with local historical 
experience in commercial activities led to the start-up of private firms based on small 
family workshops (Wang, XU et al and BAO et al in this issue).   
But most importantly it gave the local governments bigger opportunities to engage in 
initiatives promoting the local accumulation of capital. They did so through 
establishing and expanding TVEs (Township and Village Enterprises) sometimes 
owned by the local governments, sometimes representing joint enterprises with 
private capital or through initiatives attracting private capital from local, national or 
international  sources.   
“Diaspora networks” played an important part in re-enforcing the rapid capital 
accumulation from foreign investment (Kuznetsov, this issue). Throughout the 1980s, 
the opening to FDI and international trade attracted partners mainly from the Greater 
China area—Hong Kong, Taiwan Province, Singapore, and overseas Chinese from 
other continents. It was not until the second half of the 1990s that multinational 
companies from North America and West Europe came in on a large scale. And still, 
by 2003, Hong Kong, together with Taiwan, remains the first and primary source of 
FDI, holding about half of the total FDI in China. The fact that the members of the   6
Diaspora could communicate directly with local authorities reduced investor 
uncertainties.   
The second line of action, also called “incremental reform”, opened up new spaces for 
economic activities outside the entities inherited from the central planning  era.  As  a 
result, the ownership structure of industrial enterprises changed rapidly. As can be 
seen from figure 3 below, by 2003, each of the three types of ownership—the 
state-owned, FDI related and other domestic - were responsible for roughly one third 
of output.   
Figure 3 Ownership structure: Industry by 2003
Source: based on China statistical yearbook Table 14-2
2004http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/ndsj/yb2004-c/indexch.htm
Note: the calculation is for all the firms which have annual turnover
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It is important to note that a big share of the firms belonging to the category of “other 
domestic” enterprises primarily reflects rapid growth in the number and size of 
township and village firms over which local governments have some influence. The 
township and village enterprises that played a major role for industrialization in many 
regions in China outnumber both the domestic private and the state-owned firms; they 
underwent a transformation from collective ownership to become private owned since 
the mid-1990s.   
Export led growth 
International trade was initially pushed by favorable policies and gradually pulled by 
     7
FDI and intra-trade in Global Value Chain. Today China’s economy has reached a 
much higher level of openness than all other large economies in the world, developed 
or developing (Table 2 and Figure 4). 
Table 2 Openness of China to the Global Economy 
 
1978 1989  1997  2002  2003 
GDP (￥100 million)  3624.1  16917.8  78973  120333  135823 
Sum import and export 
(￥100 million) 
355.0 4156.0 26967.2  51378.2 70483.5 
Source (for Table 2 and Figure 4): based on China Statistical Yearbook 2004; 
http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/ndsj/yb2004-c/indexch.htm, 
http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjdt/zygg/P020060109431083446682.doc  








1978 1989 1997 2002 2003
%
 
Export structure has been upgraded (Figure 5). The share of primary products, such as 
foodstuff, agricultural products and mineral fuels, have been reduced from half of the 
total in 1980 to less than 10 percent by 2002, while the share of manufactured goods 
increased to more than 90 percent. In manufactured exports, electric and machinery 
products including electronic products, demonstrated the fastest growth rate. But light 
and textile products and apparel increased considerably as well.   
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Figure 5 Export Structure






















1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2002 1 Primary products  2 Chemicals
3 Light & textile products 4 Electric & machinery products
5 Miscellaneous incl. Apparel 6 Other products
 
Beyond quantitative growth, qualitative or structural change has been radical. It is 
useful to make a distinction between global production chains that are driven mainly 
by demand factors—buyer driven chains, and those driven mainly by supply 
factors—producer driven chains (Gereffi 1999, UNIDO 2002). In the products of 
“buyer-driven” chains such as apparel, footwear and toys, contained in category 3 and 
partly in category 5 in Figure 5, China has become the preferred manufacturing 
location of a global “Triangle” relationship. The consumption sites are largely in 
North America and West Europe while Hong Kong and Taiwanese businessmen play 
roles as relational coordinators. Many of these goods are produced in factories owned 
by Taiwanese or Hong Kong investors; some are produced in Chinese owned firms 
but produced in sub-contracting relationships (see Zheng paper this issue).   
In the “producer driven” industries such as computer and IT products which are 
included in category 4 in Figure 5, exports are mainly manufactured in factories 
owned by Western and Taiwanese investors. For 2003 it is reported that 61.9 percent 
of high-tech export was produced by fully foreign-owned and 21.4 percent by partly 
foreign-owned firms; altogether FDI-related manufacturing produced more than 80 
percent of high-tech export from China (China S&T Indicators 2004). This reflects 
overall trends of the innovation system of China characterized by easy access to 
foreign technology while weak in local and domestic clustering. We will turn to this 
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point in sections 3 and 4.   
Domestic demand and investment 
The domestic market has also played a role for the development in the period. 
Domestic demand experienced at least two rounds of surge and growth. The first 
round appeared through the 1980s and the first half of the 1990s, and it was led by 
household durables and necessities, as illustrated by color televisions in Table 3 and 
Figure 6. The centrally planned economy had left huge areas of shortage in consumer 
goods industries. The combination of bureaucratic decentralization and incremental 
reforms stimulated investment in the supply capacity of these industries.   
The second round begun around 1999 and was focused on real estate, passenger cars 
and personal computers and telecommunications, as illustrated by microcomputers 
and passenger cars in Table 3 and Figure 6. Cement and rolled steel products are 
intermediate products and both rounds stimulated demand for them. The second 
period of demand-led growth had strong weight of large-scale activities such as 
construction and car production, which consume them in great quantities, hence one 
sees accelerated growth in the latter years. To expand production capacity a very high 
rate of growth in investment was necessary.   
The second surge of manufacturing was more directly induced by central monetary 
and industrial policies. In order to cope with the stagnation and deflation that 
appeared in 1998-1999, diagnosed as caused by lack of effective demand, the 
government engaged in “active fiscal policies”, to increase public investment in 
highways, telecommunications and power generation stations. The banking system 
was also engaged in stimulating “domestic demand” in consumption. It created loans 
for individual housing and car consumers at reduced interest rates.   10














1978 0.02  0.38  2208.00  6524.00     
1980 1.32  3.21  2716.00  7986.00  0.54   
1985 12.35  435.28  3693.00  14595.00 0.90   
1989 37.47  940.02  4859.00  21029.00 3.58  7.54 
1990 24.07  1033.04  5153.00 20971.00  3.50  8.21 
1991 63.03  1205.06  5638.00 25261.00  6.87  16.25 
1992 158.03  1333.08  6697.00 30822.00  16.17  12.62 
1993 346.41  1435.76  7716.00 36788.00  22.29  14.66 
1994 393.42  1689.15  8428.00  42118.00 26.87  24.57 
1995 682.56  2057.74  8979.80 47560.59  33.70  83.57 
1996 786.21  2537.60  9338.02  49118.90 38.29  138.83 
1997 974.01  2711.33  9978.93 51173.80  48.60  206.55 
1998 1156.87  3497.00  10737.80 53600.00  50.71  291.40 
1999 1337.64  4262.00  12109.78 57300.00  57.10  405.00 
2000 1826.67  3936.00  13146.00 59700.00  60.70  672.00 
2001 2333.64  4093.70  16067.61 66103.99  70.36  877.65 
2002 3135.11  5155.00  19251.59 72500.00  109.20  1463.51 
2003 4820.86  6541.40  24108.01  86208.11 202.01  3216.70 
Figure 6 Growth in representative products






















Air-conditioner 10000 set Color television 10000 set Rolled steel products 100000 ton
Cement 100000 ton Passenger car 1000 set Microcomputer 10000 set
 
Source (for Table 3 and Figure 6): China Statistical Yearbook 2004; 
http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/ndsj/yb2004-c/indexch.htm, 
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A unique pattern of economic growth 
In about a quarter of a century China’s economy has been characterised by high rates 
of economic growth and capital accumulation. Some of the mechanisms behind that 
growth pattern are unique while some have parallels with the institutional set up that 
promoted capital accumulation in England in the 18
th century (Qian 1996). 
The reforms that were initiated more than 25 years ago unleashed restrained material 
needs. It was explicitly argued that getting some concentration of wealth among the 
few was a first step toward making everybody better off; this made the strife for 
material wealth ideologically legitimate. Slumbering entrepreneurship was awoken to 
engage in production and trade both within and outside the public sector. The most 
important driver behind capital investment and economic growth was a specific local 
fusion of political and economic interests. Local authorities and local entrepreneurs 
were able to promote simultaneously their political career and their own economic 
interests by stimulating industrial growth in their region, province, town or village. 
Most of the extra income created remained under local control and the incentives to 
reinvest the surplus were strong. 
Foreign direct investment emanating primarily from overseas Chinese investors and 
later on from wider sources should be added to this as an important factor. Joint 
ventures offer good opportunities for public and private rewards for local policy 
makers. The same is true for attracting direct investment in purely foreign-owned 
enterprises to the locality. Building infrastructure and supplying cheap labor, energy 
and land has become a key concern for local administrators. This mixture of political 
and economic interests constitutes a new kind of concentration of power at the local 
level not always balanced by local political democracy and local rule of law and it 
may explain why the local administration is less popular than the central government 
among Chinese citizens (Saich 2004).   
The dynamics of reform has also been driven by the competition between localities to 
offer the most attractive framework conditions. This sometimes takes the form of   12
   
offering cheap resources and lax regulations in relation to environment and workers’ 
safety. But there are also examples of forward-looking ideas developed locally and 
then spread nation-wide. 
Limits to growth 
The development trajectory behind the high speed of growth is now confronted with 
barriers for further growth. Some of these are external and refer to potential trade 
conflicts. Others reflect domestic problems with social and ecological sustainability. 
There are indications of serious weaknesses of the innovation system. The call for 
‘harmonious development’ may be interpreted as an attempt to give new direction to 
the recognized unsustainable growth patterns.   
Remarkable global impact and trade disputes.   
China’s economic growth has had a very visible impact on the global economy. When 
China’s exports and imports grow with double digit rates it makes a major difference 
for the rest of the world. The impact upon other countries’ trade balances is such that 
there is an upper limit for how far the trade surplus can be increased without 
triggering trade quotas or other forms of retaliation. The current trend of massive 
penetration into global markets may not be lasting much longer. 
“Job less growth” 
In terms of GDP structure (Figure 7 and Figure 8 compare China with four big 
developing or transition economies: Brazil, South Africa, India and Russia) China 
appears to be overwhelmingly “industrialized”. However, China is faced with the 
challenge from “job-less growth” in the manufacturing sector. Figure 8 shows that in 
terms of employment structure China appears as an agricultural economy, half of the 
labor remains in this sector. Only India has a bigger proportion of the labor force in 
agriculture. Combining the two sets of data it is obvious that China is characterized by 
high and rapidly growing capital labor-ratio in the manufacturing sector. While there 
is net job creation in the first years of the reform period, the increase of employment   13
slowed down in the 1980s and stagnated since the 1990s.   
Figure 7 GDP Structure in Comparison

































Source: For the data on China: Statistical Yearbook 2004 (http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/ndsj/yb2004-
c/indexch.htm ), for the Data on Brazil, South Africa, India and Russia: World Facts and Figures at
http://worldfactsandfigures.com
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This displacement of employment exacerbates the “structural unemployment” (Lewis 
1955). “Jobless growth”, in addition to inequality in wealth distribution and 
redistribution entails social instability and endangers sustainable development.   
Widening income gaps and negative environmental externalities 
Gaps between the urban and the rural, between regions, and between the rich and poor 
in the same region are widening. Working conditions and workers’ safety have been 
largely neglected. Negative externalities also include environmental degradation such 
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as pollution of air and water and exploitation and wasteful use of other non-renewable 
resources. The current development mode entails intense consumption of 
non-renewable raw materials and energy sources. Especially when these inputs are 
under the control of local groups with vested interests there may be a tendency to set 
prices too low and to be lax in terms of safety regulations.   
Slow pace in competence and competitiveness upgrading 
The industrialization process has not resulted in building a widespread and robust 
indigenous innovation capability in Chinese firms. After twenty years of being the 
origin of manufactured goods “made-in-China”, China’s economy has not been able 
to embark upon the track of competence upgrading. This contrasts with the catch-up 
history of the US and Japan where “made-in-US” and “made-in-Japan” were preludes 
to the two countries, within a time span of one generation, reaching the world frontier 
in terms innovativeness and competitiveness. China remains specialized in low 
value-added products with profit margins trapped at meager 2-5 percent, or in some 
areas even lower.
1
Recent policy documents and the general debate have pointed to these problems and 
contradictions, and to the need for a shift in the development strategy with stronger 
emphasis on ‘harmonious development’ and ‘endogenous innovation’. What 
adjustments of the development strategy are needed to realize the intentions signaled 
by these concepts?   
 
1 Low profitability of commodities made in China is a common knowledge, although the 2-5 percent is a 
rough estimation. For example, the TV industry, which is known as that it has well developed 
competitive advantage, has profit margins rather thin, because key components for final products are all 
imported from Japan, Korea and Taiwan. It is reported that in 2005 average net profit of the TV industry 
was as low as less than 3 percent, and for some firms it was lower than 1 percent, even though the 
industry had introduced flat panel TV sets one year ago and expected to improve the industry’s 
profitability record. (Shangwu shoukan (Business Watch Magazine) 28 October 2005). Ninbo City, 
Zhejiang province, is an important export-manufacturing base. It exported US$ 12 billion worthy 
clothing, cigar lighters, air-conditioners and so on in 2003. Having weak negotiation capacity with 
international buyers and engaged in low end of value-chains, the exporting firms had net profits around 
10 percent and some lower than 5 percent. (IT jingli shijie (CEO & CIO China) 9 November 2004).   15
   
Before we discuss this issue in Section 4, it is necessary to analyze the reform of the 
innovation system that accompanied decentralization and privatization. The analysis 
of the reform and its outcome points to weaknesses of the current innovation system 
and it helps us to specify what reforms are required in order to make innovation 
endogenous and to make it contribute to harmonious development. We will argue that 
efforts to stimulate endogenous innovation may go hand in hand with promoting 
harmonious  development.      
3. The Transformation of China’s Innovation System
We now turn to the transformation of the innovation system of China, in the context 
of market-oriented economic reform. It is interesting to note that the motivation for 
the reform of the R&D-system initiated 1985 was ‘highly systemic’ in the sense that 
the focus was on re-shaping the division of labor and the interaction between 
producers and users of knowledge and innovation. As we shall see the problems that 
remain after the reform can also be defined as ‘highly systemic’. The fundamental 
weakness of the system, having a negative impact both on the absorption of foreign 
technology and on domestic innovation, has to do with an economic structure that 
does not support learning by interaction in organized markets. 
The attempt to re-configure the user-producer relationships 
China has an old civilization and historically she has made important contributions to 
global science and technology (such as compass, gunpowder and paper). In the older 
history of China, however, science and technology as it evolved in Western Europe 
was not regarded as important or as carrying social status. While the heritage from 
Con Fu Tse gave high prestige to the intellectuals, it was to intellectuals engaged in 
humanistic science and in political and administrative affairs. Scientific and 
technological knowledge was seen as based upon practical experience, rather than as a 
modern type of scholarship. Whereas Research and Development (R&D) 
establishments started to be organized in the 1920s to 1930s, China could only begin 
the process of institutionalization of modern science and technology nationwide in the   16
   
                                                
1950s.   
The R&D system established in the first period of development was designed in 
accordance with the centrally planned regime. One prominent feature was the huge 
size that was a reflection of the Marxist idea of science as a societal force of 
production and also a result of the self-reliance development strategy in the centrally 
planned period (see Table 4).   
The second feature was the separation of industrial R&D centers from productive 
enterprise users. The centrally planned regime had introduced particular mechanisms 
to link up R&D activity with production: All the R&D institutes, except those 
belonging to the Chinese Academy of Sciences (which was assigned to be the national 
top organization for comprehensive natural and engineering science) were organized 
under the jurisdiction of sector specific ministries or bureaus, independently outside 
enterprises. The ministries or bureaus took the responsibility for planned production 
tasks as well. They were hence in command of both R&D and production (Gu 1999: 
151-176).   
It is interesting to note that this model of specialization according to product category 
both for R&D centers and enterprises, and separation of firms from innovative 
activities was common for all the former centrally planned economies.
2 The 
organizational separation between innovation and production blocked the system from 
vital and intimate interactions between producers and users, which are important 
especially for innovation in sophisticated producer goods technology (von Hippel 
1994, Kline and Rosenberg 1986, Lundvall 1988).   
The institutional setting was reflected in innovation characteristics. For example, the 
machinery industry of China was apt at “general purpose” machinery, and weak in 
technologies fulfilling particular machining tasks since these could only be developed 
through interactive learning and close producer-user communications (Gu 1999 
 
2 See Granick 1967 for former Soviet Union and for more general discussion see Hanson and Pavitt 1987.   17
   
127-135). The low degree of effectiveness of the centrally planned institutional 
settings was well acknowledged at the end of the 1970s. This became one important 
motive for the launch of reforms. 
Table 4 China’s Investment in R&D 
Year  Percentage of R&D Expenditure 
Based on National Income 
Year  Percentage of R&D Expenditure 
Based on GDP 
1953  0.1  1978  1.5 (1.8 of national income) 
1954 0.2  1979  1.5 
1955 0.3  1980  1.5 
1956 0.6  1981  1.3 
1957 0.6  1982  1.3 
1958 1.0  1983  1.4 
1959 1.6  1984  1.4 
1960 2.8  1985  1.2 
1961 2.0  1986  1.3 
1962 1.5  1987  1.0 
1963 1.9  1988  0.8 
1964 2.1  1989  0.8 
1965 2.0  1990  0.8 
1966 1.6  1991  0.8 
1967 1.0  1992  0.7 
1968 1.0  1993  0.7 
1969 1.5  1994  0.7 
1970 1.6  1995  0.6 
1971 1.8  1996  0.6 
1972 1.7  1997  0.6 
1973 1.5  1998  0.7 
1974 1.5  1999  0.8 
1975 1.6  2000  1.0 
1976 1.6  2001  1.1 
1977 1.6  2002  1.2 
1978  1.8 (1.5 of GDP)  2003  1.3 
Sources:  China Statistical Yearbook on Science and Technology various issues; National Statistics Bureau 1990: 207, and 
http://www.sts.org.cn/KJNEW/maintitle/MainTitle.htm
The crucial event for the R&D system reform came in 1985, slightly lagged to the 
agricultural and industrial reforms, which were started in 1978 and 1984 respectively. 
A 1985 Decision made by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China 
initiated the reforms in Science and Technology System Management. The central 
theme for the reform was to rearrange the relationship between knowledge producers 
and users and their relationships with the government. In a context where demand, 
supply and coordination factors were changing, reform of the S&T system was seen 
as indispensable.     18
   
The size and complexity of the S&T-system made reform crucial for the success of 
economic growth--By 1980 there were 4,690 research institutes affiliated to 
administration bodies higher than the “county” level, i.e. to central, provincial, and 
regional/city governments, with some additional 3000 institutes at the county level, 
the lowest level of the nation’s administration hierarchy with independent budget 
(“White Paper” No. 1: 232, 235). 323,000 scientists and engineers worked in these 
institutes. The then Prime Minister Mr. Zhao Ziyang interpreted the reform as the 
following:  
The current science and technology institution in our country has evolved over the years 
under special historical situations. The advantages embodied in this system manifested 
themselves in concerted efforts to tackle major scientific and technological projects, 
which were achieved with great success. However, there is growing evidence to show 
that the system can no longer accommodate the situation in the four modernizations 
programme, which depends heavily on scientific and technological progress. One of the 
glaring drawbacks of this system is the disconnection of science and technology from 
production, a problem, which is a source of great concern for all of us.... 
By their very nature, there is an organic linkage between scientific research and 
production. For this linkage a horizontal, regular, many-leveled and many-sided channel 
should be provided. The management system as practiced until now has actually clogged 
this direct linkage, so that research institutes were only responsible to the leading 
departments above, in a vertical relationship, with no channels for interaction with the 
society as a whole or for providing consultancy services to production units. This is the 
root cause of the inability of our scientific research to meet our production needs over 
the years.... This state of affairs can hardly be altered if we confine ourselves to the 
beaten track. The way out lies in a reform (Zhao Ziyang 1985). 
The adaptive policy process and the recombination of competences  
For reforming the S&T system, a two-pronged policy was designed. On the one hand, 
“technology markets” were established to function as distributive institution for R&D 
outputs (Decision: Section III). On the other hand excellence-based allocation 
mechanisms were introduced for the allocation of public R&D funds (Decision: 
Section II). In order for R&D institutes to be able to respond to opportunities arising 
at the market place, some degree of autonomy, in terms of hiring personnel, engaging 
in contracted project, and acceptance and use of contractual fees, were assigned   19
   
                                                
(Decision: Section VII). At the same time subsidies from the government were 
gradually reduced (Decision: Sections I and II). It was expected that by push and pull, 
the previously publicly funded R&D institutes would move to serve their clients via 
regular and multiple linkages.
3
The actual process of S&T system reform, as the reforms of the over all economic 
system, unfolded through trial and error and entailed continuous adjustment of 
policies (Gu 1999 Part I). The technology market solution, central in the initial design, 
was soon recognized as being difficult to realize in its original form. The users were 
not capable of absorbing transferred technology, and the market was too small to 
secure R&D institutes with enough earnings. Buyers and sellers experienced serious 
uncertainty in assessing the use value of technology giving rise to disputes when 
writing and implementing contracts. As a response, in 1987 reform policy began to 
promote merger of R&D institutes into existing enterprises or enterprise groups. The 
merger process was also difficult to realize, however. Huge gaps between the merging 
parties, from differences in work culture and administrative affiliations, were hard to 
overcome immediately.   
In the next year (1988) the Torch Programme was launched to encourage something 
like spin-off enterprises—called NTEs (New Technology Enterprises), from existing 
R&D institutes and universities. Local governments contributed to investment in 
infrastructure and supporting institutions for the New and High-Tech Industry Zones 
that became incubation bases for the NTE-startups. Scientists and engineers, often 
with support from their parent institutions, went into commercial application of their 
inventions and expertise by means of the creation of NTEs. And by the early 1990s, 
 
3 Note that the Decision recognized the diversity of R&D institutes in terms of their function. It divided 
them into “technology development type”, “basic research type”, and “public welfare and infrastructure 
services type”. The reduction of public funds was mainly applied to the technology development type 
and it was done gradually to be complete in a time span of five years. Consequently by 1991, the 2,000 
plus, out of the 4,000 in total, technology development institutes had had their public “operation fees” 
entirely or partly cut. Roughly the sum of the reduction accounted to slightly less than RMB 1 billion (or 
USD 200 m), or about one tenth of the overall government S&T budget in 1985.   20
   
                                                
reform policy included another solution to change individual  R&D institutes into 
production entities. This, as well, was an adaptation to an actual evolution already 
realized by many industrial R&D institutes.   
At the end of the 1990s, the reforms came to a kind of conclusion. In 1999 an official 
decision pointed to the need to clarify the actual character of the previously 
government-run industrial technology R&D institutes. By 2001,
4 as a stage of the 
clarification, some 1,200 industrial technology R&D institutes have re-registered their 
business type. Of them more than 300  were  merger cases, these institutes have 
canceled their independent position and become a part of an enterprise. 600 plus have 
changed to become profitable firms in themselves. A few have entered into a 
university. Table 5 indicates the changed structure of R&D performers. In 2000 the 
proportion of R&D performed by “enterprises” leaped up abruptly (see line 3, Table 5) 
largely because a number of previous R&D institutes became registered enterprises or 
part of existing enterprises. Table 4 also depicts the scope of technology market and 
spin-offs, both grew steadily over time (lines 1 and 2), illustrating the complementary 
effects of various transformation means. Lines 4 and 5 and 3 show a changed structure 
in technology sources. China, not so long ago nearly closed to international exchange 
in technology and knowledge, has become a widely open innovation system, with 
enormous inflows of technology in forms of international capital goods and FDI.   
 
4 See: http://www.sts.org.cn/report_3/documents/2002/0207.htm    21
   
Table 5 Selective indicators to changes of the China NIS   
（All the measures at current price） 
 1985  1990  1995  2000 
(1) Technology Market 
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(3) Domestic R&D expenditure (RMB Billion) 
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(4) Import of capital goods (USD Billion)    16.24  16.85  52.64  69.45 (1999) 
(5) FDI (USD Billion)  1.96  3.49  37.52  40.72 




Adaptive policy evolving though trial and error characterizes “gradual reforms” in the 
whole process of economic transition in China. The great uncertainties associated 
with foreseeing the impact of major political reform made adaptive policy learning 
necessary. Only policy-making that was responsive and adaptive to the feed-back 
information on the impact could preserve the feasibility for success of any radical 
social innovation program (Metcalfe 1995, Gu and Lundvall 2006). 
A review of the transformation of the innovation system 
On the basis of the discussion above, Figure 7 illuminates the National Innovation 
System of China as it looked before (part A) and after (part B) the transformation. It 
embraces (1) innovation actors—R&D institutes, capital goods industries they 
provide embodied technology as the means for user sectors, domestic end-product 
manufacturers; (2) inflows of technology—by means of technology licensing (TL), 
sample machine procurement (SMP), equipment procurement (PE), foreign direct 
investment (FDI), and original equipment manufacturing (OEM); and (3) interactive 
relationships between actors and with domestic and international markets, we use 
arrows with different line boldness to illustrate the intensity of the various links. It   22
gives a first impression of what significant changes that the transformation has 
brought into the system.   
 


















The transformation was constructive in safeguarding and recombining technological 
capabilities in the context of market reform and opening to the global economy. It has 
supported the rapid growth in the economy as a whole. For example, a number of 
NTEs like Huawei, Datang and Linovo, grew to become key ICT enterprises and this 
led to a fundamental restructuring of China’s ICT industry (Gu and Steinmueller 
1996/2000). The achievements are especially impressive when comparing with Russia 
where scientific and technological capabilities were destroyed on a huge scale. It 
nonetheless leaves the system with some prominent weakness. 
Easy access to foreign technology while weak in local and domestic clustering   
First of all, the resulted system developed weaker domestic links and interactions than 
international links, although the mastery of the latter links remains rather passive 
dominated by the import of foreign technology embodied in machinery and other 
process equipment. The capital goods industry has not played a role as innovation 
center for the whole economy by providing appropriately advanced production means 
for various users; they were instead largely integrated into the respective global value 
chains. Many regions of China, for which the autonomy of policy decision-making 
   
 
 
             
                                                           
 




  Figure 9 Transformation of the China’s NIS 
TL: Technology Licensing 
SMP: Sample Machine Procurement 
PE: Procurement of Equipment 
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was strengthened during the market reform, are weak in geographical 
proximity-based clustering or networking even when there is some firm 
agglomeration (Wang and Tong 2003). In general potential local or domestic links 
along and between value chains have been slow developed and hard to expand. Small 
firms in traditional manufacturing sectors, and agriculture and rural development have 
received inadequate support from national and regional technological infrastructure, 
showing a separation between the modern and the traditional part of the system 
(Tylecote, this issue). 
Missing technological infrastructure and supportive institutional development 
Second, the transformation ignored the development of technological infrastructure 
and supportive institutions. The remarkable aspect of the reform is that the initial 
intention - to establish markets for technologies for existing R&D institutes and 
existing enterprises was not realized. Instead other unforeseen adaptations ‘saved’ the 
reform. A general tendency was vertical integration of R&D and design with 
production activities - either through merger into enterprises or through the 
establishment of downstream production. This was true not only for R&D institutes 
for industrial technology but also for institutes engaged in health and agricultural 
R&D and even for universities. As a result, the reconfiguration of the scientific and 
technological infrastructure was not complete during the market reforms. This has 
resulted in a weak capability to provide S&T inputs and supportive services to 
innovation in firms; a capability that is fundamentally important for knowledge based 
growth (Nelson 2004, David 2003).       24
   
                                                
There were several reasons for the drive toward vertical integration. One reason was 
the peculiar pattern of division of labor for R&D institutes inherited from the centrally 
planned system in which they had already been involved in many “down-stream” 
activities.
5 Weak absorptive capacity and less developed social capital were other 
reasons for the difficulties to establish markets for technology.   
The phenomenon of factories that integrated vertically within themselves all stages in 
the production process were common in all centrally planned economies (Granick 
1967). Kornai (1980) explained this with a combination of the factories’ hunger for 
investment and the paternalistic relation with the planning authority. The vertically 
integrated factories were left almost untouched by the market reforms, and this 
obstructed networking in the core part of the economy. Vertically integrated 
enterprises survived, mainly in what had been seen as strategic sectors and especially 
in the machinery industry that was given high priority before the reform.     
4. Problems, debates and challenges   
By the second half of the 1990s, symptoms increasingly indicated that the 
development dynamics created by reforms was about to be exhausted and negative 
sides of the growth model came more into focus. The accession to WTO added to the 
need for China to move into a new period of economic and NIS transition. This was 
the background for the 1999 Decision by the Communist Party and the State Council, 
where it declared the need for “enhancing technological innovation, developing high 
technologies and promoting commercial production of S&T achievements”.
6  
However there has not been much change in economic policy and in the orientation of 
 
5 Data show that in 1985 the centrally affiliated R&D institutes engaged mainly in “experiment 
development” and “design and production engineering”. According to internationally standards half of 
their works were not “R&D” but downstream innovation related activities such as “design and 
production engineering” “diffusion and technical services”. The locally affiliated R&D institutes went 
even downward further. Similar phenomenon was observed in other centrally planned systems to a less 
extent. 
6 For the full document, refer to http://www.most.gov.cn/t_a3_zcfgytzgg_a.jsp    25
   
                                                
development, except “active fiscal policies” which targeted material infrastructure 
construction and a considerable increase in public investment in R&D. 
With the further accumulation of problems the government now has decided to make 
“endogenous innovation” and “harmonious development” key components of a 
renewal of the development strategy. In this section we analyze the problems and 
introduce the policy debate around “endogenous innovation”. Starting from the 
innovation system perspective and taking into account the historical transition of the 
system we propose an interpretation of endogenous innovation where it is understood 
as a move toward innovation driven growth and learning based economic 
development. 
“Endogenous innovation”
7 and policy debates 
In October 2005, the Communist Party Central Committee and China’s Government 
stipulated the Guiding Vision for the 11
th National Economic and Social Development 
Program (2006-2010). It emphasizes the importance of adjustment of development 
strategy which should be economizing material inputs, upgrading economic structure 
and innovative capability, be friendly to environmental protection, balance between 
urban and rural development and between the development in east, middle and west 
regions, and maintaining job creation and social equality (CCCPC 2005). The key for 
realizing the new strategy is endogenous innovation (zi-zhu-chuang-xin) and 
continuous reforms to build harmonious development. One can see that the new 
strategic vision accommodates several of the problems discussed above. 
Policy debates on endogenous innovation following the decision may be considered as 
 
7 There are different English translations of the Chinese term zi-zhu-chuang-xin,  here we use 
“endogenous innovation”. “Independent innovation” appears quite often in English version of Chinese 
media report, to which we tend to disagree, for it causes misleading. In the China’s context put an 
adjective “zi-zhu” to “innovation” is for an emphasis that strategically China has to be proactive to do 
something new but not passively stay with existed and imported technologies. Readers are better to 
understand the fashionable Chinese term zi-zhu-chuang-xin simply as “innovation”.    26
   
                                                
a follow-up of earlier long-lasting debates.
8  One of the focal points concerns the 
theoretical rationale for alternative development strategies—whether the strategy 
should be based on comparative advantages, or if it should involve strategic industrial 
policy aiming at catch-up and leapfrogging. Another focus of the debates relates to the 
buy-or-make question of technology. Here one opinion insists on the necessity to 
increase investment in domestic R&D so as to develop competence in core 
technologies and technological capabilities, national brands and to build independent 
capabilities in relation to defense, health care and other national specific needs. The 
opposite opinion argues in favor of buying/borrowing technologies from abroad; it 
claims that high R&D-investment has yet brought advantages neither for the country 
nor for enterprises. The third focus is upon policies for FDI. Whether, and to what 
extent does FDI contribute to technology acquisition and upgrading? Were the 
policies aiming at attracting FDI by opening the huge domestic market successful? 
Should the favorable treatment for FDI continue or should regulatory conditions be 
identical for domestic and FDI-related businesses? 
The debates have thus raised several different issues and not always been clearly 
focused. The emphasis on promoting free market and trade liberalization in policy 
spheres was to some extent unavoidable in a period when China was engaged in 
economic and social transition away from a centrally planned regime. Nonetheless, 
the current debates may be understood as recognition that free markets alone have 
their limits when it comes to guide social and economic transition and development.   
Endogenous innovation as strategic notion towards innovation driven growth and 
learning-based economic development 
In order to clarify the current debates, we believe it is necessary to put on top of the 
debates the central theme “how to embark on innovation driven growth and 
learning-based economic development”. Otherwise many of the debates might go 
nowhere.  
 
8 The following discussion based on various sources from media reports and from personal exchanges.     27
   
For example, borrowing technology and domestic development of technology are both 
important; they actually are complementary in most real innovation process. To see 
policies that encourage domestic firms innovation as conflicting with policies that aim 
to acquire foreign technologies would be misleading. Comparative advantages are 
necessary reference points for operational planning, while strategic planning needs to 
consider how existing comparative advantages can be renewed and upgraded. To 
promote endogenous innovation, a conventional and simplistic response would be to 
invest more in science and technology, and re-enforce the tendency that R&D 
organizations move into downstream activities. It is highly questionable if such an 
effort would make any major difference and overcome the weakness in competence 
upgrading at the firm level and in internal clustering and dynamics.   
The crucial question is how to overcome the weaknesses the China’s economy and 
innovation system encountered; and for this it is essential to define endogenous 
innovation as a strategy for innovation driven growth and learning based development. 
We believe that the fundamental challenge is still to make the innovation system as a 
whole to work in such a way that it contributes to economic growth and harmonious 
development. This is actually what the China’s government Guiding Vision for the 
11
th National Economic and Social Development Program (2006-2010) declares.   
Reconfiguring innovation systems in the context of the globalizing learning 
economy 
The idea that economic development is a process where the degree of specialization 
and the division of labor grow and become more complex, and the mastery of 
knowledge generation and application increasingly sophisticated, goes back to Adam 
Smith, and has been discussed widely by economic historians (e.g. Madisson 1991, 
Fei & Ranis 1997, Hayami 1997). Human learning, which takes place by doing and 
through science-based innovation, is the most important source for economic growth 
that involves the deepening of the division of labor and increase in scale economies as 
well as dynamic effects (North 1996, Lundvall and Johnson 1994). In the current   28
   
context of global competition, deregulation and radical technical change the dynamic 
effects become increasingly important. The acceleration of the rate of change implies 
that the speed of learning becomes increasingly important for the competitiveness of 
firms and national systems. One of the authors has referred to this change in context 
as ‘a globalizing learning economy’ (Lundvall and Borras 1998, Archibugi and 
Lundvall 2002). China’s experience shows that development in the context of 
globalizing learning economy has made it very essential to facilitate the learning pace 
and intensity.   
One of the major focuses of the innovation system perspective (Nelson and Winter 
1982, Freeman 1987, Lundvall 1992, Nelson 1993) is about how an innovation system 
generalizes and diffuses knowledge through learning. Learning takes place in 
specialized R&D centers that transform local experiences and laboratory experiments 
into more general knowledge and diffuse it through training and publications. But 
learning also takes place in production and consumption. Producer learning results in 
productivity growth. Consumer learning results in change in the composition of final 
demand (Pasinetti 1981). Learning by using refers to how users of complex systems 
or advanced process equipment become more proficient as they experience and solve 
problems (Rosenberg 1982).   
However, the development of new products and processes, especially capital goods 
and sophisticated devices, has to involve an interaction and information exchange 
between users and producers (Lundvall 1985). Interactive learning is pervasive in a 
modern economy, which is characteristic of sophisticated patterns in division of labor. 
More fundamentally, ‘learning by interacting’ generalizes and spreads the initially 
local learning consequences throughout the whole economy, in the form of new 
machinery, new components or new software-systems embodied knowledge, and tacit 
and human embedded competences and business solutions (Lundvall 2006). 
How a system gets interactive learning to work well is crucial for innovation and 
development performance of a national economy. Interactive learning is carried out 
in a hybrid structure of governance consisting of markets, organizations and networks,   29
   
which we call “organized market” (Lundvall 1985). Perfect competition with arm’s 
length and anonymous relationship between customer and seller cannot support 
product innovation. Vertically integrated firms also excludes product innovation and 
an economic structure dominated by such firms would make an economy less rich in 
terms of learning experiences and also more rigid and therefore quite vulnerable to 
market turbulences (Lundvall 2006, Richardson 2002). 
Learning takes place through user producer interaction where, for instance, one 
producer of machinery absorbs information about user experiences from many diverse 
users. The interaction at this level may be seen as an important dynamo for innovation 
driven economic growth. Different from conventional thoughts, the perspective of 
interactive learning points to the importance of the structure of the production and 
innovation system: the absence of a strong domestic capital goods sector would 
constitutes a serious handicap for the innovation system. Similar considerations apply 
to knowledge intensive business services. Today such services play an increasingly 
important role for economic growth. While it is necessary for production enterprises 
to have in house R&D-activities in order to be able to absorb knowledge from the 
outside, having access to knowledge intensive business services is a great advantage. 
Empirical studies from different countries show that firms that outsource the 
production of such services experience rapid productivity growth (Tomlinson 2001).   
Network formation is crucial for the improvement of interactive learning by 
augmenting and mediating ‘complementary’ but not ‘similar’ innovative activities 
(Saxenian 1996, Baldwin and Clark 1997, Langlois 2003). ‘Social capital’ supports 
networking and interactive learning across organizational boarders (Woolcock 1998). 
Social capital may in this connection be defined as ‘the willingness and capability of 
citizens and organizations to make commitments to each other, collaborate with each 
other and trust each other in processes of exchange and interactive learning.’ 
The above paragraphs illustrate the importance of applying a systemic perspective 
when designing an innovation policy aiming at endogenous innovation. From the 
NIS-perspective the promotion of endogenous innovation needs to be built upon an   30
   
understanding of the two major themes: interactive learning and system efficiency. 
The policy discussion in the following sections will draw upon the ideas developed 
above. We see some of the major challenges for the reform of China’s innovation 
system as having to do with a need to reconfigure user-producer relationships and to 
stimulate new forms for user-producer interaction in the context of innovation. 
Innovation policies to overcome the limits to growth and foster endogenous 
innovation and harmonious development 
At the end of section 2 we listed a number of problems that emanate from the current 
trajectory of economic growth. At the end of section 3 we pointed to weaknesses of 
the current innovation system. In what follows we will, from the innovation system 
perspective, briefly present some ideas for the next transition of the innovation system 
that responds to these problems and weaknesses and take into account the global 
context. 
Address domestic needs 
An inexorable factor for innovation is demand characteristics; it offers both incentives 
and demand information. Enterprises in China should not miss the rich resources of 
domestic market, reflecting heterogeneous regional, habitual and cultural variation in 
needs, and reflecting both advanced and basic needs. A general shift toward home 
markets would also reduce international friction in relation to trade. 
One way to promote harmonious and sustained development is to direct innovation 
activities toward domestic social and ecological needs such as health services, 
education, transport, energy and environment. China has the necessary planning 
capacity to coordinate R&D and the development of industrial competence and 
qualified demand, using a pragmatic mixture of market and administrative   31
   
                                                
governance.
9
To respond to the demands emerging domestically would open ways to stimulate and 
nurture novel ideas for endogenous innovation. In the longer run that would 
eventually make it possible for China to contribute both to market demand in the 
international market and to human well-being. In short, addressing domestic needs is 
a necessary ground for “peaceful development” and harmonious development.       
Engage in product innovation and improve engineering capability 
At the level of the single firm product innovation addresses new needs in the market 
and therefore it may be seen as an important way to make the market grow. Process 
innovation, on the other hand, improves the efficiency of the production process. Both 
types of innovations are important for the survival of the firm. But for the innovation 
system as a whole product innovation may be more efficient in promoting innovation 
driven growth and job creation. It enriches the division of labor and it opens larger 
space for interactive learning. While product innovation creates jobs, process 
innovation alone tends to reduce jobs (Pianta 2005). This distinction is especially 
important in an economy with big labor reserves and jobless growth in its most 
dynamic sector.   
Jobless growth results partly from lack of product innovation, and partly from weak 
engineering capability. The weak engineering capability is reflected in the massive 
import of means of production such as machinery and in weak indigenous provision. 
Engineering capability is the ability to implement and realize innovation based upon 
innovative ideas, which in themselves are experiencing dramatic change and 
improvement (Dodgson, Gann and Salter 2005). Policies that stimulate domestic firms 
to develop new products in the form of new process equipment that can be used by 
domestic firms would certainly promote endogenous innovation through the stimuli 
 
9 It is interesting to note that the market economy par excellence, the United States, has a much more 
active government policy to support science and technology than Japan and Europe. But the government 
programs appear as part of health and space related programs, not as industrial policy.   32
   
for interaction at the core of the innovation system that it represents. 
Product innovation takes place also in the form of new services and increasingly the 
knowledge intensive business services have become strategic parts of the innovation 
system (Tomlinson 2001). They interact with many users that can profit from the 
development of more efficient services that embody the experiences of many diverse 
users. In a strategic perspective building a strong and dynamic sector around business 
services may be a necessary step toward innovation driven growth in China. The 
growth of this sector has until recently been slow and there is also a great potential for 
job  creation  in  this  sector.    
Building user competences and institutions supporting the competence of SME’s 
Since user-producer interaction is crucial for the success of innovation it is not 
sufficient to merely promote the competence and knowledge creation of suppliers. 
One important reason why the 1985 reform did not succeed in building markets for 
science and technology was that the potential users did not have the competence to 
absorb advanced knowledge. This is why the dominant pattern was vertical 
integration and knowledge producers going into production. To improve interactive 
learning, user competence is as important as the competence of the producer, and in 
China this constitutes a major bottleneck for learning and innovation.   
Competence refers to scientific capabilities as well as to the capacity to engage in 
learning by doing and organizational learning. To promote the building of scientific 
capabilities incentives for enterprises to engage in R&D-activities may be combined 
with incentives to hire highly educated personnel. To stimulate the diffusion of 
organizational learning among firms a combination of benchmarking good practice in 
terms of organizational and inter-organizational learning may be combined with 
competence based selection and ‘job-rotation’ among top managers.     
For small and medium-sized firms in traditional sectors, including agro-food business, 
specific institutes and self-organized initiatives with the task of diffusing technical   33
   
                                                
innovations and good organizational practice may be supported by the public sector. 
Such firms have the needs for non-expensive access to technological service and 
knowledge institutions. Especially in periods with unemployment among graduates, 
engineers and scientists it might be considered to give such firms public support to 
hire their first engineer/graduate.   
Develop a responsive science and engineering base 
The 1985 reform resulted in a structure where universities and other institutions with 
main responsibility for basic research became strongly involved in commercial 
activities. With the improvement of the level of competences at the level of firms, 
universities and public R&D-centers should redefine their roles and withdraw 
gradually from downstream commercial activities that are not easily combined with 
the search for excellency in science and technology.   
Improvement of public funds management, and the development of scientific 
community-based academic evaluation would largely increase the efficiency of 
knowledge production. Such a shift may actually be combined with a more intense 
communication with industry both in research and in higher education.
10 In the more 
global knowledge society it is important, as well, to combine that with participating in 
international academic communities and to expose the academic research to 
international competition. Such changes would certainly increase the rate of return 
from the increased investment in R&D that the Chinese Government is beginning to 
implement.  
Develop new forms of participatory governance of economic organization   
There are different forms of governance, and the degrees to which people tolerate 
 
10 A stronger element of practical experience and a more problem oriented learning methods in academic 
training of scientists, engineers and managers would be a most efficient way to create stronger links 
between universities and enterprises. The same would be true for more systematic efforts by universities 
to offer life-long learning to these categories. But the most important change would be coming from the 
increased hiring of academic personnel by the enterprises.   34
   
social gaps differ also among the rich countries. Some advanced rich countries operate 
with wide social gaps while others are more egalitarian. The first group includes the 
US and the UK where ordinary people are less participatory; they are expected to 
adapt passively to new technologies. The second group includes the small European 
welfare states where ordinary workers take active part in innovation as well as in the 
sharing of the benefits that innovation creates.   
In China one way to stimulate participation in processes of change is to establish 
cooperative ownership to firms. This might be especially relevant for densely 
populated agricultural regions. International Labor Office (ILO 2003) calls for 
rediscovering the cooperative advantage in poverty reduction, warning at the same 
time that people have to learn lessons from negative experiences in the past. One of 
the lessons is to let the cooperatives grow through self-organization and learning, 
another is to support the formation of qualifications of leaders and participants.   
Improving education and stimulating the mobility of skilled labor 
The most fundamental and dynamic resource in the innovation system is people. 
Every single person is a potential user and producer of technology and knowledge. In 
order to enhance user competence and facilitate interaction between users and 
producers, improvement of education and training is one of the basic means. 
Universal secondary education in poor rural areas is a way to prepare residents for 
participation in knowledge and skill-intensive agricultural and related activates or for 
becoming members of new generations of urban residents. 
The education system has to be modified in terms of curricular design and 
pedagogical methods in order to promote the problem solving capacity of students. 
Increasingly interaction will depend upon experts who are both creative and 
co-operative. Elite education needs to be complemented with universal and life-long 
continuous education for the strategy of endogenous innovation and harmonious 
development.  
But not all competences emanate from formal education and training. With rapid   35
   
change the learning that takes place at work becomes more and more important. 
Stimulating the diffusion of ‘learning organization’ practices among enterprises is 
fundamental both for stimulating endogenous innovation and for the on-going 
upgrading of skills of the workforce. 
The mobility of people across organizational borders shape social connections and 
interaction. Enterprise employees and managers with a university educational 
background will be the ones that have the least difficulties to establish collaboration 
with researchers at universities. Therefore schemes that make it attractive to move 
back and forth between academia and the enterprise sector may be seen as especially 
important.   
Develop networking and learning regions 
Regions can be springboards for endogenous innovation, if they develop and exploit 
specialized strengths based on firm networks that contain tacit knowledge (Cooke and 
Morgan 1998). The local and regional dimension has become crucial for growth 
through reforms of bureaucratic decentralization. But the development toward 
learning regions has been less impressive. There is a need for a new incentive 
structure and for policy capacity building at the regional and local level. Reform 
should aim at rewarding innovative solutions that promote networking and save scarce 
resources. 
There is also a need to give central government a stronger role in the redistribution of 
wealth between provinces and regions. Central government could also play a more 
important role as promoter of regional policy and managerial learning. 
Social capital and endogenous innovation 
In sum, endogenous innovation and harmonious development require are a new set of 
efforts rather different from those made in the 1980s and 1990s. It involves reforms of 
the institutions that support markets and make contracts trustworthy but it also 
involves broader social changes that support the interaction among economic agents.     36
   
Corruption and irregularities in the use of legal systems undermine trust and thereby 
they undermine a critical prerequisite for interactive learning across organizational 
borders. Innovation is, because of its inherently uncertain character, especially 
vulnerable to lack of trust. To foster the rule of law and a competent and honest public 
administration is therefore an integrated element of any strategy for innovation and 
learning-based development. In the current context fostering good governance 
especially at the local level and at the enterprise level may be a key to enhancing 
innovation. 
One way to illustrate the task of promoting endogenous innovation and harmonious 
development is to present it in terms of four types of capital – see table 6: 
Table 6: Resources fundamental for economic growth – combining the tangible 
and reproducible dimensions 




Tangible resources  Production capital  Natural capital 
Intangible resources  Intellectual capital  Social capital 
 
Production capital can be easily produced and reproduced. The same is true for 
intellectual capital. But production capital loses much of its use value when natural 
capital is eroded - once the land and the drinking water have been polluted it is 
immensely expensive to clean it up. Intellectual capital is created through interactive 
learning and it will depend strongly on social capital. In a society, where people trust 
the institutions and each other and are ready to co-operate willingly also outside the 
most narrow group, learning will flourish. 
Endogenous innovation and harmonious development implies a growth model that 
gives attention not only to production capital and intellectual capital. Avoiding the 
degradation of natural capital must be a key element in a strategy favoring   37
   
harmonious development. Stimulating the formation of social capital is a key to long 
term success in promoting endogenous innovation. Social capital is the basis for 
interactive learning and therefore the lubrication that makes the innovation system 
work smoothly.   
5. Conclusion 
In this paper we have analysed the forces behind rapid growth in China. We have 
shown that pragmatic policies and policy learning have been central for the success. 
We have also pointed to challenges posed by the growth pattern and to remaining 
weaknesses in the innovation system. 
These challenges and weaknesses are reflected in the new political signals giving 
priority to the concepts endogenous innovation and harmonious development. 
Building upon the historical experience we argue that the best way to interpret these 
concepts is to see them as signalling innovation driven economic growth and learning 
based economic development. 
The global context and the historical starting point is different than it was in 1985 but 
the basic perspective for reform with focus upon interaction between users and 
producers of knowledge and technology remains pertinent when designing the next 
major transition. Strengthening domestic demand and the competence of domestic 
users of technology is a key to success. Enhancing the knowledge base of strategic 
sectors producing process equipment and knowledge intensive business services for 
the market is another important element. Investing in ‘social capital’ – designing 
institutions so that citizens become more ready to collaborate and learn from each 
other is a way to promote endogenous innovation.     
Many aspects of both the success and the problems that China’s experience contains 
are unforeseen in previous catch-up history and in existing theories. This is true for 
the limits for export-led development strategy, the inadequacy of manufactured export 
in spreading learning effects, the extreme rate of substitution of capital for labour, and   38
   
the severe structural unemployment phenomenon. The response to these accumulated 
challenges means that China embarks on a new development strategy characterized by 
endogenous innovation and harmonious development, which we have interpreted as a 
strategy of innovation driven growth and learning based development.   
As China succeeds in pursuing harmonious development it will become clear that it 
does not represent any threat to other countries. For those who hope China to offer a 
unique successful experience, we need to point out that the actual process of 
adjustment unavoidably will involve uncertainties and setbacks. We wish that 
innovation studies may serve an instrumental and positive role, and certainly 
innovation studies can learn a lot from the transition that China will undergo in the 
coming years.   
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